

ON THE MEANING OF NIPĀTĀS -A COMPARATIVE OUTLOOK

DR. T. ARYA DEVI, READER & H.O.D., FACULTY OF INDIAN LOGIC, SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT, KALADY -683 574.

Yāska divides the whole vocabulary of Sanskrit Language into four. They are Nāma, Ākhyāta, Upasarga and Nipāta.¹ Among them Nāma and Ākhyāta occupy important position in the language because of their possession of separate meanings. The case of Upasarga and Nipāta is different. It was a matter of controversy as to whether they possess any meaning or whether they are mere auxiliaries. We can understand from Nirukta that even at the remote time of Yāska there was controversy among the linguists about the meaning of Upasargas. Yāska puts forth names of two famous linguists who varied

in their opinion about the meanings of the Upasargas.² He states that while Śākaṭāyana admits no meanings to Upasargas, Gārgya is of opinion that Upasargas have meanings Then Yāska himself explains meanings of Upasargas.³ Twenty Upasargas are explained by him.

But he doesn't mention any controversy on the meaning of Nipātas. He defines Nipātas as those, which fall in so many meanings. About twenty-two Nipātas are mentioned by Yāska in the first chapter of Nirukta. Iva, cit na, nu etc. are some among them and these are explained by giving illustration from Vedic passages.

Upasargas

In Vedic Sanskrit we can see that the Upasargas are used separately. But in classical Sanskrit it is not so. If the particles 'pra'etc. are prefixed with roots, then only they are called Upasargas. The problem regarding Upasargas is that they are not of the same character. Some of them modify the meaning of the root as in the cases Anugacchati, Upagacchati, etc. Some of them do not make any change in the meaning of certain roots to which they are prefixed. Eg. Nivasati, Prativasati, Nirunaddhi, etc. Some of them when prefixed to some roots give an altered meaning, sometimes just the opposite. Eg: The root "gam" which is in the sense of "go" expresses the meaning 'come' when it is prefixed with M. So it is very difficult to take a firm stand on the problem that whether the prefixes are having any meaning.

If we accept the meaning 'prakarşa' to the prefix 'pra' as 'pra' possesses that meaning in 'prayatate', it cannot be called correct because in 'pratisthate' the meaning of 'pra' is not prakarşa. As this kind of problem exists on the acceptance of meaning to Upasargas linguists pertaining to such and such philosophies put forward some theories about the meaning of Upasargas.

Famous Gangeśopāddhyāya in the śabdakhaṇḍa of Tattvacintāmaṇi states that the upasargas are dyotakas and not vācakas. The dyotakatva can be accepted as either tātparyagrāhakatva or "aupasandānika śaktimatva", On accepting dyotakatva as Tātparyagrāhakatva the meaning is expressed by the root through lakṣaṇa and the upasarga is only an indicator of the meaning of the root. If dyotakatva is accepted as aupasandhānika śaktimatva, the root preceded by upasargas possesses the sense. So hence the upasargas 'pra' etc. become śakyatvāvacchedaka. We accept that the root 'jī' preceded by 'pra' expresses 'prakarṣajaya'. We cannot accept that the prefīx 'pra' followed by the root jī expresses the meaning 'prakṛṣṭa jaya' because on accepting thus, the rule stating that it is the characteristic of the pratyayas that they generate the śābdabodha of their meaning only connected with their prakṛtis, will be violated. The upasargas are not the prakṛti of the tin pratyayas.6

On deciding the fact that which is the conveyer of the meaning the theory is that 'Ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ. In 'prajayati' etc., as



the meaning 'prakarṣajaya' is expressed by the root through lakṣaṇa, there is no need of accepting the meaning 'prakarṣa' as that of the upasarga. (1) In the case of 'vyatise' (व्यत्तिसे) etc.⁷ in which the root is not heard, the root which is lupta should be remembered and that root alone is the maker of the knowledge of the meaning. Thus summing up, he lays a rule regarding the upasargas. But there is no comment on the meaning of nipātas.

Nipātas

Jagadīsa Tarkālankāra in his Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā classifies sārthakaśabdas into three. They are Prakṛti, Pratyaya and Nipāta. Nipāta is told as

> "स्वार्येशब्दान्तरार्थस्य तादात्म्येनान्वयाक्षमः । सुबाद्यन्यो निपातोऽसौ विविधश्चादिभेदतः।१९"

The meaning of the above kārikā is, That śabda, on the meaning of which, the meaning of other śabda is not able to generate a śābdabodha with the abheda relation and which is different from the Pratyayas like 'Sup' etc, is Nipāta.

The meanings samuccaya etc of nipātas 'Ca' etc are unable to make the śābdabodha of Abheda relation with the meaning of other nouns. In the sentence 'Smṛtam anubhūtañca' we do not have the knowledge 'Smṛtaḥ samuccayaḥ' but 'Smṛtānubhūtayoh samuccaya.'

In the sentence 'Caḥ śabdaḥ' the word 'Caḥ' is not a nipāta. So there may be the śābdabodha of abheda relation. The Nipātas are many. Some of them are Ca, tu, nañ, punar, iva, eva, evam, sma, mā, etc. Thus Jagadīśa Tarkāla ńkāra says that nipātas are vācakas.

Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, the famous Vaiyākaraṇa, in the opening lines of Śabdakaustubha proclaims that the word 'atha' in the sentence 'Atha Śabdānuśāsanaṃ' is only a dyotaka of the meaning 'beginning' and it is not a vācaka, just like an upasarga. (अय शब्दः प्रारम्भस्य द्योतक न तु वावकः निपातत्वात्, उपसर्गवत्।) We cannot accept the upasargas as Vācakas, because in sentences like 'Upāsyate Guruḥ, Anubhūyate Sukhaṃ' etc. Karmāṇi lakara will not be appropriate without accepting them as Sakarmakas. So the Upasana, Anubhava, etc. should be considered as the meaning of the roots. So it is very clear that Upasarga are only dyotakas. It may be said that even though the Upasargas are not Vācakas, the Nipātas should be accepted as vācakas. But that is not correct. In order to speak of the objects Guru, Śiva, etc. in sentences like 'SākṢātkriyate guruḥ', 'Alamkriyate Śivaḥ', etc, the objects should be vācya of the root.

Moreover we accept dyotakatva in Nipātas which are vyāpaka;So Upasargas also become dyotakas. When we accept rule,² it should be applicable to each one in a category.

Bhattojidikṣita says that moreover just like accepting Lakṣaṇa in 'viśiṣṭajaya' for 'vijayate', we can also accept lakṣaṇā in 'Samuccitaghaṭa' for 'ghaṭaśca'. He also says that if we accept that

the nipātas are vācakas, the rule stating that there will be 'abhedānvayabodha' between two nāmārthas must have to be contracted as to the effect that it is not applicable to the nipātas. This is not reasonable or valid. If we accept vācaktva to nipatas, we will have to accept the usage 'ghaṭasya ca' as correct in the sense of 'ghaṭasya samuccayaḥ'. Like wise, as we use 'Śobhana Samuccaya' we will have to accept the usage 'Śobhanah ca' also correct. Another problem shown by Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita is explicit in the lines of the verse (of Kalidasa)-

ततः प्रतस्थे कौबेरीं भास्वानिव रघुर्दिशम्।

शरैरुद्धीरेवोदीच्यानुद्धरिष्यन् रसानिव। we have to accept the meaning of 'Usraiḥ' as Usrasadṛśaiḥ; and sādṛśya cannot be accepted as the meaning of the nipāta 'iva'. (The nipāta 'iva' is only a dyotaka) because there is no Kāraṇatva to Usras (rays). The Śaras or arrows are the Kāraṇas and they are described as similar to the rays or usras). The meaning of the Instrumental case will make the anvayabodha only along with the meaning of its prakṛti. The instrumental case being a kārakavibhakti, cannot come from 'iva'.

The word 'nañ' is a nipāta and Paṇini has allowed Samāsa with that particle and that compound is called as Nañtatpuruṣa. It may be asked now that if any meaning to nipātas is not accepted, the saying that importance should be given to the meaning of the latter word in Nañtatpuruṣa will be improper. The answer to this objection is that here the word Artha only mentions the dyotakatva.

In the vārttika "निपातस्थानर्थकस्य", the word anarthaka is meant as pādapūraṇanipāta, which are not having any dyotyartha. This is clearly stated in the commentary by Kaiyaṭa. Bhaṭṭoji dikṣita quote from the Tantravārttika in order to make it clear that Bhāṭṭamimāṃsakas also are of the opinion that the nipātas are not vācakas.

चतुर्विधे पदे चात्र द्विविधस्पार्थनिर्णयः। क्रियते संशयोत्पत्तेर्नोपसर्गनिपातयोः।। तयोरधाभिधाने हि व्यापारो नैव विद्यते। यदर्थद्योतकौतौ तु वाचकः सः विचार्यते।

Even though Nāgeśa also is of the opinion that nipātas are dyotakas, he refutes some of the arguments put forward to establish the dyotakatva of Nipātas by Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita. For example, he refutes the theory; 'Sāmānye pramāṇaṃ pakṣapātaḥ' by which Bhattojidīkṣita asserts dyotakatva to Nipātas. Nāgeśa is of the opinion that if that theory is applied to assert dyotakatva to nipātas, applying by the same theory, the avyayas which are still more vyapakas can be asserted as dyotakas. But grammarians do not admit this. Nāgeśa also makes it clear that in the dyotakatvagraha, Nipātatva is not the Avacchedaka. The dyotakatva of such and such nipātas resides in such and such nipātas and avaccedaka is the particular attribute (Asādhāraṇadharma) of the nipātas. Here a general rule cannot apply. Even without knowing the word as nipātas, persons have awareness of the meaning on hearing

the sentences including nipātas. Nāgeśa also rules out probability of the improper usages like 'Śobhana Ca' in the sense of 'Śobhana samuccaya' and 'Ghaṭasya Ca' in the sense of ghatasya Samuccayaḥ. Nāgeśa explains that the nipātas being dependent words, the meanings of nipātas are always used as adjectives. It is the characteristic of those words.

Bhaṭṭojidikṣita after vehemently criticising the view of Vācakatva, in the end says that otherwise we can accept the nipātas as vācakas. His opposition is only against the Naiyāyikas who accept Upasargas as dyotakas and nipātas as vācakas, which is ridiculed by him as ardhajaratīya (as is half old and half young) It is his opinion that one must accept either nipātas including upasargas as vācakas or as dyotakas. It is not fair to accept upasargas as dyotakas and nipātas as vācakas.

The reasons put forward to establish the dyotakatva of nipātas in vaiyākaraņabhūṣaṇasāra also are more or less the same as put forward in the Śabdakausthubha.

But here Kaundabhatta agrees that in the samuccayādhikāra, Bhāttas have expressed the view that the nipāta 'ca' is vācaka and it is not correct to apply dyotakatva śakti to 'cakāra' on accout of gaurava.

But Kaundabhatta is of opinion that there is no gaurava because in the sentences like 'ghataśca' the word ghata expresses the meaning 'samuccitaghata' by lakṣaṇa. The nipāta 'ca' is tātparyagrāhaka. So, as here is no gaurava in both views, both of them are correct. (घटादिपदानामेव समुख्यिते लक्षणा, तात्पर्यप्राहकः प्रकरणादिवच्चादिरित स्वीकाराज्ञ शक्तिद्वयकल्पनापि। अस्माकं लक्षणाप्रहदशायाम् बोधतत्तत्कार्यकारणभाव आवश्यकः। एवं शक्तिप्रहस्यापि इति पक्षद्वयेपि कल्प्यान्तराभावेन गोरवाभावादुभयमपि युक्तमित्यभिमतम्।) That is why Bhartrhari says that upasargas are either vācakas or dyotakas. (स वाचको विशेषाणां संभवात् द्योतकोपि वा) But the view that upasargas are dyotakas and nipātas are vācakas is not correct.

Naiyāyikas are of opinion that the upasargas are dyotakas. Even though Bhartrhari has told that they can be told as either dyotakas or vacaka in the above quoted kārika, he clearly states in another place that the upasargas are dyotakas. Phipatas like 'ca' 'nañ'etc. are vācakas. Even Pāṇini admits meaning to ca as in the aphorism "चार्य द्वन्द्व:". Samuccaya, anvācaya, itaretarayoga and samāhāra are said to be as the meaning of 'ca'.

On accepting dyotakatva or vācakatva, the problem is that as to what should be accepted as the avacchedaka of dyotakatva or vācakatva. Whether 'upapasargatva' is the avacchedaka of dyotakatva or nipātatva. According to Bhaṭṭoji, nipātatva is the avachedaka of the dyotakatva because it is the vyāpakadharma than upasargatva. That is why even the Naiyāyikas accept 'Kāryatva' as the avacchedaka of kṛtijanyatva and not the ghaṭatva, paṭatva, etc.

But Naiyayikas make it clear that they accept the vyāpakadharma as the avacchedaka only when he gaurava occurs. They accept 'kāryatva' as the avacchedaka of kṛtijanyatva because otherwise we have to accept many dharmas like ghaṭatva, paṭatva, etc. as the avacchedaka. Where only one particular comes, there that particular becomes the avacchedaka. Thus the kṛtitva is the avacchedaka of ākhyāta śakyatā. Here in the case of dyotakatva, actually upasargatva cannot be considered as the avacchedaka. Even though one doesn't know 'pra' as upasarga, he has awareness of 'prakarṣajaya' on hearing 'prajayati'. So we only assume 'pra' 'para' etc. are dyotakas and not as upasargas are dyotakas. So, here 'pratva', 'paratva' etc are the avacchedakas.

The nipātatva also cannot be the avacchedaka of vācakatva or dyotakatva, because the nipātatva resides in those nipātas also which are neither dyotakas nor vācakas but mere pādapūraņas.

According to experience, we accept dyotakatva or vācakatva to upasargas and nipātas. The nipāta 'nañ' (নহা) is abhāvavācaka. Likewise 'ca' is also a vācaka. The nipātas eva, evam, yatha, etc. are vācakas. In the t sentence 'candra iva mukhaṃ' has the sense sādṛśya. So it is a vācaka. In the verse "शरेहरी" etc. the nipāta 'iva' is a dyotaka.



One cannot insist that words in a language should be of such and such character. Only we can observe the particularities and come to the conclusions.

पादटिप्पणी-

- तान्येतानि चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते चोपसर्गनिपाताश्च.
- २. न निर्वद्धा उपसर्गा अर्थान्निराहुरिति शाकटायनः। नामाख्यातयोस्तु कर्मोपसंयोगद्योतका भवन्तीति।।
- आ प्र परा अभि प्रति अति सु निर् दुर् नि अव उद् सम् नि अप अनु अपि उप परि अधि।
- ४. उच्चावचेष्वर्थेषु निपतन्ति।
- ५. उपसर्गा क्रियायोगे।
- ६. प्रत्ययानाम् प्रक्रत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वम् ।
- व्यतिसे इत्यादौ लुप्त स्मृतो धातुरेवार्थप्रत्यायकः।
- ८. सामान्ये प्रमाणानां पक्षपातात्।
- क्वचित् संभविनो भेदाः केवलैरनिदर्शिताः। उपसर्गेण सम्बन्धो
 व्यज्यन्ते प्रपरादिना।