

Ānvīkṣikī - AS BENEFICIAL TO PHILOSOPHY

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Vidyā is knowledge obtained through a specialized process; the word is formed by adding suffix *kyap* to *vid*, which yields the dictionary meaning, knowledge, lore, learning or science.¹ In India the number of lores is not fixed. According to Kautilya, and Kāmandaka, these are only four. Ānvīkṣikī, Trayī, Vārtā and Daṇḍanīti. Manu adds Ātmavidyā as the fifth to this list.² Popularly, however, the lores are fourteen. – The four Vedas, six angas, Dharma, Mīmāṃsā, Tarka/Nyāya and the Purānas. With the addition of four upavedas of medicine, military art, music and polity, sometimes they are stated to be eighteen. The number may vary, but the place of Ānvīkṣikī is permanent in the list.

The word Ānvīkṣikī is derived from the root *ikṣ* preceded by *anur*, which means, to see again or to observe. Thus observing a thing again after it is known by śabda or pratyakṣa is *anvīkṣā* and the lore prompted by such observation is Ānvīkṣikī or Logic, the science of reasoning.³ In Śukranīti, it is stated that logic is beneficial to philosophy.

There is no philosophy without doubt. In fact, doubt is the very starting point of any philosophical enquiry. Annihilation of doubt and ascertainment of a thing in philosophy depends to a large extent on the methodology of Nyāya, namely thesis and antithesis, otherwise called as *pakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Nyāyasūtras of Gautama follow a logical literary form of three stages; *uddeśa*-the main topic, *lakṣaṇa*-the definition and *parīkṣā*-critical examination. In Indian philosophy, *parīkṣā* is usually done, first by mentioning the actual or possible objections against the theme i.e. *uddeśa*. This is the *prima-facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*). The objections are

then answered from the point of view of defence, the rejoinder (*siddhāntapakṣā*),

Critical examination, *parīkṣā* is done on the basis of *pramāṇas*, means of knowledge.⁴ The word *pramāṇa* is formed by suffixing *lyut*, instrumental affix to *mā*, preceded by *pra*. So it is an instrument by which something is rightly known.⁵ Out of the four *pramā*, as that are recognized by the logicians, here *pratyakṣa* is intended to be discussed as beneficial to philosophy.

Pratyakṣa is the sense experience or immediate experience that is the primary source of knowledge. This is called empiricism. We emphasise *pratyakṣa* as all other *pramā*, as are preceded by it. Nothing is in mind or intellect without its first being in the senses. Perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact, and which is not due to words, invariably related to the object and is of a definite character.⁶

There are various theories in the Indian tradition of the particular processes of perception. Annambhatta says it is two-fold; indeterminate and determinate, or non-constructive and constructive perception.⁷ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika held that in *nirvikalpa* also, the object is with its properties; but they seem to emerge, so to say from their confused and vague condition. It is only in the *savikalpa* that they are recognized through memory and are made the object of conceptual judgements.⁸

The Buddhists made a somewhat similar distinction between determinate and indeterminate, but used it for a different purpose. They held that illusion of things is generated by language. Thus for them, *nirvikalpa* involved only a pure awareness of data. The categorizing of the data into classes is due to the process of construction i.e. *vikalpa*. Thus conceptual judgements are contributed by the individual and don't reflect natural facts. Śāṅkarācārya accepts negative perception or *anupalabdhi*. One of the puzzles about perception is that we seem to 'perceive' the absence of something. Śāṅkara argues that "I am ignorant" and such similar locations express an awareness of the penumbra of nescience that surrounds, so to say, our determinate knowledge.⁹

Rāmānujācārya, the Vaiṣṇava theist philosopher has discussed this topic at length in his Śrībhāṣya. While controverting the attributeless Brahman, he argues on the basis of two-fold perception and proves that neither can comprehend Brahman without attributes.¹⁰ He says that *savikalpa* has to be with attributes “*saviṣaya*,” as it is associated with *jāti*, *guṇa*, *karma* etc.; but even the *nirvikalpa* is *saviṣaya*. At the most it could be said that *nirvikalpa* is devoid of some attributes, but not all the attributes. Such a thing is improbable, he says. All our cognitions are of the nature, ‘*idamittham*’, it is like this. In this cognition, *idam* is the object and *ittham* is its attribute, an affirming epithet. When Brahman is described as ‘*satyam jñānam anantam satyam*’ etc. are nothing but the attributes or qualities of it.

The five membered syllogism is indirectly used by Rāmānuja.¹¹ This appears quite convincing to the readers; but one wonders when the same logic is used by the absolute monists to prove exactly the opposite thing, namely, *pratyakṣa* cannot comprehend *saviśeṣa* Brahman. *Viśeṣa* means *bheda*, distinction and direct perception is unable to grasp this. To prove this a common example of ‘*ghaṭaḥ asti*’ is analysed. In this sentence, two things are apprehended, 1) the existence of a jar and 2) it is different from other things (e.g. *paṭa*) Now both these things cannot come in the realm of *pratyakṣa*, as it lasts only for a moment and the two things mentioned above require at least two moments. Thus, in one moment either of the two can be grasped; the intrinsic nature (*swarūpa*) of a thing or its difference from others (*bheda*). But *bheda* of a thing would not be known unless and until its *swarūpa* is known. Thus *bheda* is always dependent on the nature and so cannot be apprehended in one moment of *pratyakṣa*. Only the existence, *sat* or *swarūpa* can be grasped.¹²

Thus we see that same logical thinking is put to use by two different philosophers to bring home their contrary views.

In Western logic we have two types. Deductive logic is reasoning by deduction; inference from particular; and the other is

inductive-logic by induction that is inference from particular to general. In the above examples, both Rāmānuja and Śankara have made use of inductive logic to prove a general dogma on the basis of particular instances of *gotva* and *ghaṭastitva*.

Early Buddhist canons give the process of sense - perception like this.¹³ Sense perception consists of three componenets; the eye as sense organ, visible form and awareness.

Rāmānuja

न निर्विकल्पस्यापि प्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः। (पक्षः)
तस्य त्रिकोणसास्नादिसंस्थान विशेषणत्वात्। (हेतुः)
विशेषणवतः पदार्थस्य सविशेषविषयत्वम्। (व्याप्तिः)
यथा प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणे गोत्वादेः प्रतीतिः। (उदाहरणम्)
प्रत्यक्षस्यापि इदमित्यमिति प्रतीतेः तत्तथा। (निगमनम्)

Śankara

प्रत्यक्षं केवलं सन्मात्रग्राही, न भेदग्राही। (पक्षः)
अस्तित्वभेदयोः भिन्नकालज्ञानफलत्वात्
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य चैकक्षणवर्तित्वात्। (हेतुः)
यत्र यत्र भेदग्रहणम् तत्र तत्र तत्प्रतियोगिस्मरणं,
यथा घटोस्ति इत्यत्र पटो नास्तीत्यवधारणम्। (व्याप्तिः)
तत्पूर्वं घटास्तित्वप्रतिपादनम् च। (उदाहरणम्)
प्रत्यक्षस्यापि एकक्षणे सन्मात्रग्राहित्वम् (निगमनम्)
न भेदग्रहणम्।

What one sees, one perceives.

What one perceives, one understands.

What one understands, one conceptualizes, or proliferates with concepts.

The same formula is repeated with regard to other four sense faculties and even mind, the inner faculty. But, this being highly subjective, is

fallible, capable of errors or mistakes. So one sees the world as it appears to him and not as it is or it may be. Thus a basic distinction is postulated between an experience and its interpretation.

For Rāmānuja, thesis (*pakṣa*) is that perception yields valid knowledge. As such though there doesn't seem to be an intrinsic connection between cognitive experience and validity, he tries to rely on the theory of grossification (*pañcīkaraṇa*). Thus a conch - shell mistaken for a piece of silver has some at least of the later. Thus the illusion represents a real perception of silver. Other philosophers think it to be misperception or illusion. Discussion of *pratyakṣa*, thus includes this aspect also, and all Indian thinkers have interpreted this to suit their own dogmas.

Illusion, popularly known as superimposition or *adhyāsa* in *kevalādvaita*, could be deducted to the progressive logic of Aristotle. This is a fine instance of deductive logic, presented by Śankara in his introduction to *Brahmaūstrabhāṣya*.

This is an unusual example of Indian philosophical principle fitted into the western logical process.

THE PROGRESSIVE SORITES OF ARISTOTLE

All S's are X's

All X's are Y's

All Y's are Z's

All Z's are P's

Therefore All S's are P's.

Śankara's argument that all the things experienced are creations of Avidyā, nescience, could be reduced to this logical form.

All cases of dealings, such as direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) S's are based on sense organs X's

All sense organs X's are based on body as substratum Y's

Body as substratum Y's is caused by superimposition of self on the body
i.e.

Adhyā sa Z's

All superimposition Z's are caused by Avidyā nescience P's

Therefore, all S's=P's i.e. all cases of dealings such as direct perception
are caused by Avidyā

Similar logical arguement is presented before Lord Kṛṣṇa by Arjuna, in
the Bhagavadgīta.

He doesn't want to kill the Kauravas, his own kith and kin for the fear of
incurring sin.

He argues,

Killing the Kauravas = Destroying the entire clan

Destroying the clan = Destroying the traditional kuladharmā

Destroying the kuladharmā = Emerging of Adharmā

Adharmā = Fear of ladies going astray

Wantonness of ladies = Admixture of Varṇa Varṇasamkāra

Varṇasamkāra = no oblations to the forefathers.

No oblations to manes = all rituals being uprooted.

No rituals = Permanent stay in hell

Therefore, killing of the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra = Mahatpāpam

This is an example of regressive sorites; but the more famous one is
while giving the characteristics of Sthitaprajña, Kṛṣṇa proposes this logic.

Pondering over the sense objects = attachment is produced. Viśaya
dhyāna = sanga

Attachment = passion emerged. Sanga = kāma

Passion = Anger bursts. Kāma = krodha

Anger = Delusion. Krodha = sammoha

Delusion = smṛtibhramśa

Smṛtibhramśa = buddhināśa

Buddhināśa = Praṇāśyati.

From this logical conclusion derived is; that excessive longing for sense objects leads to total destruction.

NOTES:

1. Revised and enlarged edition of Prin. V. S. Apte's The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary.ed. P.K.Gode. C.G. Karve, vol.III, Prasad Prakashan, Pune. 1995.p.1490.
2. Manusmṛti 7.43
त्रैविद्योभ्यस्त्रयीं विद्यां दण्डनीतिं च शाश्वतीम् ।
आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्यां वातरिम्भांश्च लोकतः ॥
3. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1. see commentary of Vātsayāna on this sūtra.
प्रत्यक्षागमाभ्यामीक्षितस्यान्वीक्षणमन्वीक्षा । तथा प्रवर्तत
इत्यान्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या - न्यायशास्त्रम् ।
4. Ibid. Vātsayāna in the introduction of 1.1.3.
लक्षितस्य यथालक्षणमुपपद्यते न वेति प्रमाणैरवधारणं परीक्षा ।
5. Ibid. 1.1.3.
प्रमीयतेनेनेति करणार्थाभिधानो हि प्रमाणशब्दः ।
6. Ibid. 1.1.4.
इन्द्रियार्थसंनिर्घोषोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
7. Tarka Samgraha ed. K.P. Parab. Pious Book Corporation. Varanasi. 1982.p.14.
8. Doctrine and Arguement in Indian Philosophy. Ninian Smart.Netherlands. 1992.p.173.
9. Ibid.p.175
10. Śri bhāṣya of Rāmānuja.ed. R.D.Karmarkar. B.O.R.I.. Pune.paragraph.29 on 1.1.1.
11. Ibid. paragraph.29

12. Ibid. paragraph.23
13. Majjhimanikāya.ed. V. Trenkner and R, Chalmers. 3 volumes.
London. 1948-51.1.p.111ff.
14. Brahmasūtra Introduction to bhāṣya by Śankara.
Aslo see The Problem of Logic. W. R.Gibson.p.255-256.

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